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Lost in a Battle for Identity
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Summary
This article, based on studies of nationalism, discusses identity formation in 
the European Union and compares it to the nation-state. The starting point is 
that for all its economic benefits and political innovation, the EU is failing to 
provide people with the sense of belonging and extract political loyalty. By ex-
ploring what function identity serves – for the nation-state in the past and for 
the EU in the present – it is argued that while there are limits to the EU’s ability 
to project a meaningful European identity, there are also limits to the nation-
-state’s ability to meet the political challenges of contemporary societies. One 
way, and possibly the only way out of this ‘battle for identity’ is to acknow-
ledge the real impact of the EU on the nation-state and open an honest debate 
by both European and national elites about which challenges of our time can be 
met by the EU and which are better kept at the national level. A better under-
standing of how people’s national aspirations, concerns and political demands 
are mediated between different levels of governance may lead to adapting their 
identities accordingly – loyalty and passion for the EU may follow too. 
Keywords: nation-state, nationalism, national identity, European Union, Eu-
ropean identity
Introduction
Since the arrival of the European Union (henceforth, the EU) the long-standing 
romance between the nation and the state (Luban, 1980) has been disturbed. The 
pathos and the glory of the nation, the power of the state and the beauty of its terri-
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tory were brought together by nationalism which created a sovereign nation-state in 
which not only the state was sovereign, but the nation too. The ‘national soul’, re-
flecting people’s traditions, history and unity (Luban, 1980: 392), coupled with the 
entitlements of citizenship became the expression of the modern age. The premise 
of the unwavering support and indissoluble interdependence between the nation and 
its state has been broken by the EU, which is accused of diminishing a state’s sove-
reignty and diluting national identities. The EU for all its economic benefits and po-
litical innovation is struggling to match the romance of the nation-state; European 
citizenry remains indifferent to the idea of European identity. On the other hand, the 
nation-state, entangled as it is in European integration, has lost some of its power 
and the question is whether its monopoly on people’s loyalty and sense of belonging 
can, long-term, survive European integration – undiminished. Consequently, both 
the nation-state and the EU are lost in the battle for identity, the former to maintain 
it, the latter to obtain it. 
What follows explores what function identity serves – for the nation-state in 
the past and for the EU in the present – and what are the implications of the ‘battle’ 
for identity for both the national state and the EU. I argue that the European Union 
and the nation-state are not only different political entities which are locked into a 
mutually dependent relationship, but that perceptions about their historical and po-
litical role are also different: if the major achievement of the nation-state has been 
the elevation of nationality, de facto the elevation of ethnic identity into a political 
organisation of the state coupled with sovereign power over the territory and citi-
zens’ political destiny, the European Union is seeking to de-couple nationality, ter-
ritory and sovereignty. 
I shall develop my argument mainly from the general literature on identity and 
nationalism which I take to be the main force behind the nation-state’s monopoly 
on the political and cultural identity of European citizenry. Brubaker and Cooper 
(2000) argue that the concept of identity is too ‘ambiguous’ and ‘riddled with con-
tradictory meanings’ to serve as an analytical concept. While accepting their argu-
ment, it is the ambiguity of the concept of identity what adds to its relevance in the 
present discussion. Hence, following Brubaker and Cooper, identity is linked to 
an identification with a group, thus in this article, identity stands for a ‘collective 
self-understanding of a group characterised by ‘sameness’ and a solidarity based on 
some shared attributes which can be objectively observed, but also characterised 
by their subjective reflection in a group’s consciousness’ (Harris, 2009: 82). Obvi-
ously, there are many groups that would fit this description, for example, class, gen-
der, sexual orientation, profession and so on, but in the present context, I am refer-
ring to ‘the nation’ and the identity derived from membership in it, shared historical 
experience and the role of the nation-state in cementing this identity as a powerful 
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socio-political category. I will examine the role and the character of the nation-state 
in the past and in the present and use it as a springboard for arguing that solutions to 
the challenges of our time are fast escaping its confines. In the process, the concepts 
of identity, sovereignty and democracy will be unpicked. I then turn to the EU and 
explore its pursuit of a non-national political community with a corresponding iden-
tity. In comparing the ideological projects of the nation-state and the EU, I conclude 
that both the contemporary nation-state and the European Union need new answers 
to the old question of identity in order to project credible and complementary iden-
tities for our time. 
Nationalism: Merging of Ethnicity, Nationhood and Statehood
The emergence of the nation-state was not a political inevitability, but a political 
organisation which evolved in response to historical and political necessities of its 
time (Gellner, 1994; Mann, 1995; Harris, 2009). This formation married culture, 
politics and social development when industrialisation and secularisation altered 
the expectations and aspirations of people and the position of rulers. Nations and 
states, as we know them now, are a result of slow and painful historical processes. 
Should the current nation-state no longer correspond with aspirations and expecta-
tions of contemporary societies and consistently fail to provide answers to societal 
pressures, the adaptation of the relationship between nations and states will be an 
equally long and painful process. Before I argue that we are observing a beginning 
of this process, a reminder of the genesis of the currently somewhat beleaguered 
nation-state is in order. 
The nation as a category of collective identity is important to human existence 
in both cultural and political terms. How important depends on an individual’s be-
liefs, experiences, political conditions, geographic setting and historical develop-
ment. While nations as cultural entities have always provided a degree of emotional 
and cultural sustenance, and enhancement of self-esteem through collective mem-
bership, since the 18th century the nation has come to represent political legitimacy 
and political power in the form of the sovereign nation-state. European peoples’ 
understanding of culture and politics has thus been intimately linked to national 
cultures and the symbolism of those cultures. The ‘how’ and the ‘why’ have been 
the subjects of a huge body of literature and contestation among academics, histo-
rians and nations themselves, but can be encompassed by one word – nationalism 
(Breuilly, 1993; Özkirimli, 2000). 
There are many definitions of nationalism, too many to repeat here, but the es-
sence of all nationalism rests on the idea that there is a distinct cultural group which 
inhabits a distinct territory and that this group, by virtue of its cultural distinction, 
is entitled to recognition and some form of autonomous government. So, national-
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ism’s actions are ‘designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with 
those of its governance unit’ (Hechter, 2000: 7) or as the most commonly used defi-
nition of nationalism asserts, it is ‘primarily a political principle which holds that 
the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner, 1994: 1). National-
ism is an ideology as well as a sentiment: it has a vision for the future of the soci-
ety, but unlike other ideologies, nationalism is less concerned with ‘how’ society is 
governed and more with ‘who’ governs it (Harris, 2009: 24). 
Nationalism makes appeals to the perpetuity of the nation which makes us who 
we are, to the ‘soul’ of the nation which requires love and nourishment to fulfil its 
destiny. Nationalism, over and above being a sentiment and an ideology, is then also 
a political strategy for commanding the relationship between ‘the nation’ and the 
state. The strategy may change depending on history and circumstances, ideologies 
also come and go, but the core objective of nationalism that the nation and the state 
remain sovereign, is not changing. That alone affords nationalism a unique political 
position whereby it serves as an identifier of the nation’s place in the world and as 
the guardian of the nation’s continuity, legitimacy, and interests (Brubaker, 1998: 
292). 
Nationalism identifies the group, it cements its identity and provides ‘the peo-
ple’ with a story which is necessary for the maintenance of the nation-state. Particu-
larly in times of change, cultural (who we are) and institutional discourses (how we 
do things) become mutually reinforcing in producing unity, commitment and the 
energy for tasks ahead. When we are talking about a nation-state, we are talking 
about a political project which describes and legitimizes a number of assumptions 
articulated and promoted by nationalism. These assumptions are: 
a) cultural and historical distinctiveness entitles the group (ethnos) to a go-
vernment by its people for its people, preferably in an independent state of 
and for the nation, or at the minimum, to a degree of autonomy within an-
other nation-state;
b) the nation’s existence as a separate territorial and political entity (the prin-
ciple of national self-determination) has a moral validity because belonging 
to a nation and its survival are ethical and moral principles; 
c) maintaining, producing and reproducing the national narrative (national 
identity) is of utmost importance because the nation formation is purport-
edly the culmination of a long and ongoing process which may stagnate or 
be accelerated at times, but whatever the fortunes and misfortunes of the 
national project – the nation has a destiny; 
d) the nation-state, thus furnished by nationalism, is the legitimate political 
unit for solidarity, sovereignty and the exercise of democracy. 
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The fact that there are hardly any true nation-states (of and for one nation) and 
that the majority of nation-states comprise more than one national group is a differ-
ent argument to the one I am pursuing here. We may be witnessing increased dis-
placement of people, we may be promoting cosmopolitan virtues, the nation-state 
may be enmeshed in a complex network of international organisations and institu-
tions, but, at this stage in history, the nation-state remains to be perceived as the 
main protector of cultural and physical security of people and the main framework 
for the distribution of material and cultural resources. The manufacture of national 
symbols and the maintenance of national identity are nearly synonymous and en-
hanced by a deliberate effort to construct an overarching collective identity pertain-
ing to the national state. It stands to reason that symbols inhabiting our cultural and 
political consciousness are those of the nation-state, that the nation-state has mo-
nopolized the concept of identity, and that there is little ambiguity about its role in 
politics. If nationalism is a prism through which we view the world – at this stage in 
history divided into national states – every other prism needs to offer similar, if not 
better reasons for emotional and political commitment. These traits of nationalism 
are therefore precisely the obstacles to accepting the EU as a new political entity 
worth investing with a similar commitment.
Nation-state: Conflating Identity, Sovereignty and Democracy
The successful merger of ethnicity, nationhood and statehood created the nation-
-state which represents another trinity of precious political goods: identity, demo-
cracy and sovereignty. There is a long-standing assumption that these are mutually 
reinforcing, while there are actually very different and not necessarily mutually re-
inforcing categories. Identity can be maintained in a non-democratic system as well 
as in a democratic one (in fact, it is democracy that can provide protection of ethnic 
identities better than other political systems). Sovereignty has very little to do with 
either identity or democracy, as many non-democratic sovereign states where non-
-dominant cultures are suppressed have amply demonstrated throughout history. So, 
why the confusion about the intrinsic link between identity, democracy and sove-
reignty, and why is it important in the argument about the relationship between the 
nation-state and the EU?
If the nation-state is the most evident framework for identity and sovereignty 
of the national group, there are some interrelated questions in need of further prob-
ing: how is the group determined and where does that leave democracy? The deter-
mination of the national group is mostly based on its ethnic background. In the sys-
tem of nation-states there is no escape from the cultural domination of the political 
community which gave the name to the state. This is the success of the nation-state 
and it may also be its demise, because the contemporary nation-state can no longer 
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successfully fulfil its traditional role of producing national identity while homo-
genizing the population around the national story aimed at the unity of the politi-
cal community. One ought to be cautious not to foretell the end of the nation-state 
when it still holds the vital cards in the play for people’s sense of identity and their 
understanding of politics and democracy. Nationalism and democracy are pivotal 
among ideologies of modernity because, despite the obvious tension deriving from 
the different objectives they seek, there is a fundamental historical and ideological 
congruence between them. Both nationalism and democracy are rooted in the idea 
that all political authority stems from ‘the people’ (Harris, 2009: 129). ‘The peo-
ple’ stands for popular sovereignty and participation from below, rights, beliefs, 
expectations and interests; in short, the traditional understanding of democracy is 
that its exercise requires a clearly defined legitimate political unit – a territorial 
state – in which it is clear who the ‘players’ (demos) are and where the boundaries 
of the ‘playing field’ are (Lord and Harris, 2004: 32). Thus, the ‘nation’, with its 
definition, its boundaries and its symbols, is not only an integral part of nationalist 
politics, but it is an integral part of national sovereignty, political legitimacy and the 
general understanding of democracy too. 
European Identity: Elusive, Emergent or Hollow?
Having argued the all-pervading national understanding of political identities, it is 
time to assert that the perception may be stronger than the reality. The EU, in its 
sixth decade of perpetual struggle for more effective integration, more legitimacy 
and greater authority, while still enlarging, since recently, into Eastern and Central 
Europe where the nation-state has barely managed to assert its sovereignty, is an 
impressive success. In terms of people’s affection for the EU and political commit-
ment to it, there is a degree of apathy. When compared to the nation-state, the apa-
thy about the EU can be traced firstly to the lack of emotional pull that the EU can 
exert from citizens whose loyalty appears to be placed within nation-states, and se-
condly to the confusion about its aims and structures in the face of near clarity with-
in the nation-state. The third reason which is beyond the scope of this discussion 
refers to an inadequate understanding of the nation-state’s collusion with the EU as 
a way of securing its survival (Milward, 1984).
The nation and the state are two different categories. The conflation of belong-
ing (nationhood) and organisational framework (statehood) in the form of an ethno-
-national state has been, at times, politically disastrous and is becoming less and 
less helpful for the politics of our time (Weiler, 1995: 11). The nation in possession 
of ‘its own homeland and the exercise of political rights therein’ (Mann, 2001: 209) 
is construed around the cultural heritage, but over and above the cultural descent, 
‘the nation’ comes with certain values and norms that accompany its political and 
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territorial discourse. The state, on the other hand, is a legal concept which describes 
a definite territory and the aggregate of administrative institutions. The difference 
between the nation and the state is also reflected in the distinction between nation-
-building and state-building (Harris, 2009: 23). The focus of nation-building is the 
construction and promotion of a national narrative which is based on language, 
history, literature, and other cultural traditions that together form what we call na-
tional identity. The national symbols, such as hymns, flags, monuments, emblems, 
references to national heroes, the well-established phrases referring to history and 
all similar identity markers are part of the nation-building process. State-building, 
while complementary, is ideologically a different process: it aims at the establish-
ment of a political community of citizens, a forging of social solidarity and respect 
and loyalty to state institutions. Historically, these two processes are mutually rein-
forcing, but their interdependence may have worked better in the past than it does 
in the present. 
The distinction between the nation and state-building processes is even more 
important when it comes to the EU. The identity forging processes within the EU 
are facing not just a number of nation-states with corresponding national identities, 
but two mutually reinforcing and ongoing nation and state-building processes with-
in each member state. The EU, in seeking to create a sense of political community, 
social solidarity and respect and loyalty to its institutions, should put emphasis on 
processes similar to state-building. The unity-forging process at the EU level can 
only emphasize the institutional belonging beyond and above the nation-state whilst 
acknowledging the existing cultural identities. Historically, politically and ideologi-
cally this is an unprecedented development and, not surprisingly, open to resistance 
from citizenry whose political, symbolic and cultural consciousness is still daily re-
inforced by the nation-state (Billig, 1995). 
What is the political value of cultural homogeneity, the absence of which seems 
to put the EU at the immediate disadvantage in comparison with the nation-state? 
There is a long tradition in political thought which assumes that social cohesion and 
democracy form a mutually conducive dynamic. Otherwise, the well-known maxim 
by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) that ‘free institutions are next to impossible in a 
country made up of different nationalities’ (Mill, 1991: 428) would make sense only 
if one assumes that ‘nationality’ stands for political like-mindedness. This assump-
tion is flawed; the fundamental principle of democratic politics is political consen-
sus and political equality, not homogeneous identities, and therefore cultural diver-
sity can not be an obstacle to democracy. The only pre-condition of the democratic 
process should be the willingness to engage with the process itself which then can 
create conditions for cooperation and possibly forge political unity (Mason, 1999; 
Moore, 2001).
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Behind this conflation of societal cohesion, political unity, cultural homoge-
neity, effective governance and democracy hide ideas of the 19th century nation-
-state. The corporate-like national symbolism produced by the traditional nation-
-state erected a whole set of political and cultural references whose meaning is so 
deeply entrenched in citizens’ political consciousness that any questioning of their 
continued validity creates a near existential anxiety. National symbols are those 
identity objects, stories, personalities, songs, poems, emblems of political parties, 
artefacts and so on which are recognisable to everyone and usually found in souve-
nir shops.1 For the moment it suffices to say that the nation-state has had a longer 
time to ‘enhabit’ (Cram, 2009b: 114) those symbols than the European Union and 
that while the national symbols are accepted as an evident extension of national nar-
ratives, the European symbols, in comparison, tend to appear hollow. This is not to 
say that European symbols do not – slowly – produce a similar sense of recognition 
and that national identities are not already affected by the EU and that we are not 
already witnessing the emergence of a more complex ‘marble cake model’ of Euro-
pean identity (Risse, 2005); it is rather to question the advisability of measuring the 
temperature of European identity against the national one.
European Union: An Ideological Project for Our Times?
Theories of nationalism do not agree on the origins of nations. To primordialists/
ethno-symbolists, nations are a natural progression of ancient ethnic cores, pro-
pelled into history by modernity (Smith, 1986: 21-31; Maleševič, 2004: 561-565). 
To modernists, on the other hand, nations are modern constructions whose origins 
can be found in the historical and political processes of modernity. Nations are ei-
ther ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983) formed and politicized in response 
to the challenges of industrialisation (Gellner, 1994). They could be even ‘invented’ 
(Hobsbawm, 1990) as tools for elites to pursue their aspirations and resist the exist-
ing political order or legitimize a new order (Breuilly, 1993). The agreement among 
scholars of nationalism however is that nationalism was an answer to the changing 
social, political and techno-administrative conditions and challenges thereof which 
traditional societies faced. The question here must be whether the challenges faced 
by societies in our time can be found in that classical notion of ‘the nation’ and un-
derpinned by the nation-state? 
1 This thought was inspired by Grayson Perry’s sculpture of a war-like bronze skull titled ‘Head 
of a fallen giant’ (2007-2008) which seeks to express the changing face of the British national 
identity. The voodoo-like relic of the empire is encrusted with images of national symbols in the 
form of recognizable souvenirs sold to tourists, such as the Big Ben, the Three Lions, the Queen, 
the Tower Bridge, the London bus, the Paddington bear, the British bulldog, and so on. Yorkshire 
Sculpture Park, July 2009.
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The obvious answer, after some 300 years of conflicts between national groups 
within and between states, suggests that the nation-state has failed to achieve peace 
among nations within its borders and between states. Peace is possibly the most im-
portant challenge, but there are many more challenges for the contemporary Euro-
pean nation-state. They concern its sovereignty, its institutions, its entire ethno-cul-
tural design, the meaning of citizenship, democracy and consequently its identity, 
and not in the least – European integration. The EU with its open-ended political 
character, ever expanding geographic boundaries, lofty supranational aims and con-
siderable political power has diminished the power of the nation-state, while, per-
haps paradoxically, it is basing its political structure and mechanisms for exercis-
ing influence and implementing its objectives on the acquiescence of its national 
member states. 
As the history, structures and mechanisms of the EU are not the subject of this 
paper, which focuses instead on the ideological foundations of the nation-state and 
its relation to the EU, I shall sum up the foundational goals behind European inte-
gration. These were: peace (in the words of the Shuman Declaration of 1950, ‘war 
to become not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’), economic prospe-
rity among its members as equal as is possible to achieve, the enhancement and ex-
tension of democracy across its ever expanding territory, and to transcend the na-
tion and nationalism in favour of the implementation of universal human rights and 
cooperation among its peoples. 
Joseph Weiler (1995) argues that Peace, Prosperity and Supranationalism were 
not only the founding principles of the original Community, but that they were the 
three principal strands of European idealism which the 20th century inherited (1995: 
15). He further argues that there is a difference between ideals and ideology. Ideals, 
while rooted in morality, do not provide a programme for their realisation, they are a 
part of ideology which is a programme for ‘changing reality to achieve goals’ (1995: 
3). Viewed from this perspective, European integration is an ideological project, the 
ethos of which is a non-national conception of politics among, within and beyond 
the nation-state. In the final analysis, the understanding and, indeed, the imagining 
of this non-national political community requires the abandonment of the notion 
that the political obligation, motivation and the rights of people should be delimited 
by national borders. It also requires the political participation and deliberation to 
transcend those borders. Herein lies the conundrum: while the politics and political 
competition remain dominated by national states, the rivalry for the political legiti-
macy between the nation-state and the EU is to be expected. 
If the classical nation-state sought the answer to societal challenges of the 19th 
century and continues to do so in our time through its relationship to the nation, the 
EU is seeking to answer the challenges of our time by shifting the focus away from 
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the nation-state to the people – but not any particular people. The ensuing battle for 
identity and citizens’ loyalty is actually a battle between the nation-state without 
answers to many concerns and expectations of its residents (for there is a very con-
temporary difference between citizens and residents) and the EU which may be able 
to provide many answers, but unlike the nation-state, can not count on their loyalty 
and commitment to unite behind its aims. In short, the EU remains unconvincing in 
forging a common political identity of an EU ‘people’. ‘The people’ in the case of 
an ‘EU people’ (Bellamy, 2010: 15) should however not be confused with the eth-
no-national conception ‘the people’, a point which will be elaborated below. 
Let us not labour under the false assumption that the nation-state which is a 
member of the EU is not challenged in its fundamental role as the sovereign entity 
and the guarantor of the democratic process. Any pretence by the EU to the contrary 
may be counterproductive to its efforts in seeking greater legitimacy. I begin with 
two of the most cherished triumphs of the nation-state: sovereignty and democracy. 
Sovereignty may be the weightiest concept to which the nation-state makes appeals 
and to which the population responds, but it is a concept and not an absolute value, 
and as with all concepts, sovereignty too is an historical product (Lord and Harris, 
2004: 192; Keohane, 2002). As much as it assumes an absolute jurisdiction of the 
state over its territory, there has never been a time in history where the meaning 
and the concept of sovereignty has not had to adapt to normative and internation-
al developments. In our time, when human rights violations and security concerns 
readily send armies to intervene within the borders of sovereign states, when some 
states’ territories are controlled by external powers (for example, Kosovo, partially 
Iraq and Afghanistan), and when political conditionality aiming at the democratisa-
tion of states has become a part of legitimate international politics, the concept of 
sovereignty has surely been demonstratively stretched beyond any assumption of 
inviolability. The sovereign state is a desirable notion, but it is only desirable when 
it provides security and prosperity within its borders and when it can do so with-
out endangering neighbouring states. How many state leaders can answer the chal-
lenges of contemporary societies and international community without negotiating 
away some aspects of their sovereignty? The foundation of the EU is an evident case 
where the notion of sovereignty became subordinate to new norms deriving from the 
catastrophic excesses of sovereign nation-states during the Second World War.
Democracy is the fundamental principle of membership in the EU. There are 
many reasons why that should be so, but the most important is that in such a multi-
layered, multifaceted and multinational polity all national groups have a legitimate 
interest in how others conduct their policies (Weiler, 2001: 53; Lord and Harris, 
2004: 186-187). The EU with its high levels of legal and economic legitimacy has 
surpassed other international organisations in creating a regime (Weiler, 1995: 14) 
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in which the transformation of ideology into law constitutes a cornerstone of the 
integration – this includes democracy as one of its principles to safeguard the con-
sensual governance and pursuit of the aforementioned goals. Logically, European 
integration implies a degree of constraint to state sovereignty through self-imposed 
agreements among member states. 
Nevertheless, the EU has roots in a sovereign state and only a state recognised 
as such can relinquish some of its competencies to the EU, which does not make 
the EU more sovereign than its member states, because the EU does not exist with-
out them. Krasner (1994) identifies four kinds of sovereignty and each kind can be 
negated, but also augmented, particularly within the EU. If interdependence so-
vereignty implies the state’s ability to control its borders, the movement of goods, 
people, capital and ideas, then this kind of sovereignty is being increasingly eroded 
by globalisation and European integration. On the other hand, European integration 
enables the state to navigate interdependence in safer conditions and perhaps nego-
tiate better results than it would otherwise. In terms of domestic sovereignty, the EU 
can’t supersede the authority of the state to control the behaviour of its citizens, but 
it can and does stipulate democracy, and in the cases of new democracies, provides 
a buffer for its exercise. The third kind, the legal sovereignty, guarantees that states 
can not be coerced into agreements they do not wish to enter. 
Lastly, the sovereignty with the most popular (and populist) appeal is the West-
phalian sovereignty because it implies the supremacy of the state over any other 
external power, thus non-interference in its domestic affairs. As such it is tightly 
connected to national self-determination, nationalism and national identity. Inter-
estingly enough, the evident alteration in the meaning of sovereignty of the first 
three kinds has led to the direct and indirect increase of the Westphalian sovereignty 
for many new member states, and that for the following reasons: First, the domestic 
struggles for national independence were often inspired by the fact that European 
integration was possible only to a sovereign state (for example, the successor states 
of the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and the Baltic states). Second, the 
cost and the insecurity connected to the lack of independent statehood experience 
were minimised by the integration into the larger political entity with enough safety 
nets to protect the fledgling state with its minimal economic power and shaky po-
litical foundations. Lastly, the status of otherwise unknown states was increased by 
membership in the club of well-established states, some of whom, paradoxically, 
are now seeking the support of these new member states in bolstering their own 
struggles with the EU (for example, the British Conservative Party in its indecision 
about the Lisbon Treaty relied on the Czech Republic’s initial rejection of it).
By now it must be obvious to the reader that I am arguing that the nation-state 
with all its arsenal of triumphs – national identity, sovereign statehood and demo-
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cracy – is finding itself in a transitional period from what we know to something 
yet unknown. The nation-state is finding itself in an interregnum,2 in a period of 
discontinuity. The social order has changed, a nation-state’s monopoly on power 
within and beyond its boundaries is eroding, its role in the relationship between the 
individual and the state has altered, and spaces for political contestation have es-
caped the national centre into different areas – some beyond the state into regional 
spaces, some across the borders to join the co-ethnics in another state, and yet others 
are bypassing the national level altogether and going straight to Brussels (Keating, 
2004; Keating and McGarry, 2001). What will be at the end of this transition? All 
nation-states are changing, but the change for the EU member states is rapid and 
more dramatic. What form this new(ish) nation-state will assume can not be fore-
told, but the model we are looking at in the 21st century is already different to the 
one which entered the EU in the middle of the 20th century. 
Wrong Questions about European Identity
There are some 500 million people from 27 nation-states who can call themselves 
officially a European citizen, a citizen who has at least two political identities – na-
tional and European. The meaning of citizenship and the concept of national iden-
tity need redeveloping in view of the evident fact that there is and will be a different 
nation-state with an increasing number of immigrants, many of whom will never 
become ‘nationals’ in the traditional sense because they do not wish to, and because 
the ties to their home countries are too strong. This is perhaps a concern for the tra-
ditional nation-state which has for too long elevated cultural identity to the status 
of political identity. The actual practice of politics relies on political participation, 
the compliance with rules and cooperation and commitment to state institutions – 
such a ‘polity-based’ identity (Mason, 1999: 272) is the identity that corresponds 
with the new nation-state and can be the basis for European identity too. In fact, 
national identity in the contemporary European state is partially already such an 
identity because it is at the national level where the political identity, often among 
different cultural groups, is forged and where a modus vivendi is found in order to 
create a sense of common endeavour and common future (Lord and Harris, 2004: 
187-188). 
The nation-state has a role to play in the European Union which goes beyond 
the protection of its national identity, its territory and its sovereignty. This role em-
phasizes the emancipatory character of the nation-state, which began as an ideologi-
cal project of its time accompanied by ideals of civil liberties and equal rights for 
2 Bauman, Z. (2009) Europe and the Rest. Lecture presented with Balibar, E. University of 
Leeds; 13 May, Leeds.
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all citizens. These norms have been too often sacrificed to the overwhelming power 
of nationalism. The reassertion of the nation-state against the power of the Euro-
pean Union does not suggest its strength, but a weakness bolstered up by national-
ism. The ‘new’ nationalism which we see in the rise of extreme nationalist parties 
across the European Union member states, the anti-immigrant rhetoric, the rising 
anti-Islamism and anti-Semitism, and the narrow-mindedness disguised as respect 
for tradition, is not new – these are old answers to very new questions. 
Having said all this, it is foolish not to acknowledge that common European 
identity, rooted in common existence, purpose and belonging to a common com-
munity, is failing to materialize (Checkel, 2005). Whether this is the main reason 
behind the much discussed democratic deficit (Majone, 1998; Schmitter, 2003; 
Crombez, 2003)3 is a different question altogether, but the partial answer may be 
sought in the continued belief that people’s interests may be better served by nation-
al democracy than beyond it (Bellamy, 2010). The nation-state may be changing, 
but its ability to harness identities and provide the framework for politics readily 
acceptable to citizens remains stronger than that of the European Union. It does not 
mean that this ability will remain with the nation-state and that a European identity 
will not emerge (Cram, 2009b). Identities are not static (Cerutti, 2001: 4), they are 
formed and reformed according to circumstances and aspirations of nations and eth-
nic groups, and these are in flux now as they always were. 
It is however to say that the process is slow and open to regression. Why? First, 
because asking whether there is a European identity emerging is a ‘wrong question’ 
(Cram, 2009a: 107). An appropriate answer can only be the re-hashing of old an-
swers about incompatible histories of the European peoples, the strength of ethnic 
affiliations and the lack of common values for which one is willing ‘to die’ (Smith, 
1995: 139), as if dying was the measure of the strength and value of identity. Na-
tional identities are not a God-given fact. For all implied romanticism, national 
identities are a result of nation-building processes as their symbols are a result of 
conscious design and promotion. If the nation is a ‘present-day consent, the desire 
to live together’ (Renan, 1996: 52), thus indeed an ‘imagined community’, the con-
sent and the imagining of this community have been forged by ordinary life and not 
by daily reminders of the heroic past, romantic victories and dramatic celebrations. 
The imagining of the European identity will probably follow the same route of ‘day 
to day’ reinforcement of political rather than national consciousness (Cram, 2009b: 
113; Billig, 1995). 
The nation-state in the early days of its emergence faced a similar challenge: to 
encourage and in some cases produce an identity which appeared natural, but was 
3 For a comprehensive review of the literature on democratic deficit, see Jensen, T. (2009).
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political at the same time. There is however a fundamental difference between how 
national identity was/is produced and how European identity is being encouraged, 
because the European efforts to construct an overarching identity above and over 
the nation-state are not fully within the power of the EU. Even if there is a reluctant 
European identity in formation, it is still reinterpreted and recreated at the national 
level, and therefore it is the national level where the emergence or stagnation of Eu-
ropean identity is ultimately shaped. 
The studies of nationalism teach us that the most successful rhetoric is the one 
that finds resonance with the people. It is likely that the resonance of the EU among 
the people is already greater than is generally assumed because institutions alter 
perceptions, behaviour and commitment, but at this stage when politics are still per-
formed largely at the national level, it is not easy to test the intensity of this identity. 
The only way it could be tested is for a state to leave the EU and for citizens to be 
acutely aware of how much the EU meant and how their lives would be altered out-
side this framework. At this ‘interregnum’ stage, European citizens are registering 
their discontent with national politics through elections to the European Parliament 
in the secure, but naïve, knowledge that this has a minimal impact on their life and 
possibly a benefit in passing the message to national politicians. Consequently, the 
low voter turn-outs for European elections and the choice of anti-European parties 
is not necessarily a measure of the lack of European identity. Equally, the struggles 
we witnessed during the Lisbon Treaty ratification are no reason to write off the 
possibility of the European demos in the absence of the public’s identification with 
the EU. The nation-state does not collapse every time there is a constitutional crisis; 
the EU, similarly to the nation-state, has survived many crises and appears to have 
grown into a resilient political system. 
This is a plausible foundation from which to make the following assertion: The 
whole debate about the lack of European identity is a repetition of the historical 
experience with the nation-state and its tendency to homogenize the population. At 
this stage in history there is no evidence that the EU has diminished national iden-
tities, even if it has altered the role of the state and the meaning of citizenship by 
exercising power over the former and extending the latter beyond the boundaries of 
states (Soysal, 1998). If anything, the EU has paradoxically invigorated ethnic iden-
tities. First, by curbing the power of the nation-state and insisting on the protection 
of minorities (Harris, 2009: 153-157); second, by providing an economic and secu-
rity safety net for a number of sub-national groups seeking greater autonomy (for 
example, minorities in new post-communist member states, Scotland, Wales, the 
Catalan and the Basque regions in Spain and so on). Different political frameworks 
require different conceptions of identity, which suggests that there is no need for a 
European identity along the lines of national identity. The meaning of the European 
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identity has always been an experience of belonging to many nations, of pioneer-
ing ideologies and of shifting political boundaries and commonalities despite dif-
ferences. The idea of the nation-state was born in Europe, so why arrest the birth 
of a different political framework which in itself is European in tradition and ideals 
and does not necessarily seek to abolish nations, even if it seeks to curb their ethnic 
emphases?
Conclusion
The EU is a political structure of incredible innovation and desirable membership, 
but the projection of this success appears weak and unconvincing. The goals of the 
EU respond to expectations of contemporary European societies which seek greater 
prosperity, security and freedom – the last political organisation of such success was 
the nation-state. The EU, as the organisation based on the membership of nation-
-states, but simultaneously trying to transcend them, is inevitably competing with 
the nation-state for people’s loyalty and identity, which are thus far more compel-
lingly attached to the nation-state. I have not argued about the character, durabi-
lity or veracity of national identity, but about the consequences of the nation-state’s 
ability to produce it and monopolize it. Hence, the efforts by the EU to recreate the 
same identity, but on a greater geographical scale (Cerutti, 2001: 1), while not fu-
tile, are necessarily slow, disappointing and probably counterproductive. 
The EU can not be both: it can not offer the new future while pretending that 
the old nation-state with all its assumptions from a different era will stay intact. This 
is tantamount to placating the nationalism of nation-states. The nation-state has a 
role to play in people’s lives; in some aspects of it, possibly an important role, but 
no longer a predominant role. It has failed in many ways, particularly in ways of 
peace and reconciliation among different cultural groups, and it has left many coun-
tries in dire political and economic conditions. The politics of nationalism allowed 
political tyranny and its principles have caused unspeakable brutality. I have ar-
gued that the nation-state evolved in response to historical and political challenges 
of its time and that its role in providing people with a sense of place in the world 
should not be underestimated and certainly not belittled. I have however also argued 
that the challenges faced by contemporary European societies – security, economy, 
ecology – can no longer be met by individual nation-states and that it is time to 
acknowledge the decline of the traditional nation-state and its monopoly on peo-
ple’s identity. 
The cautiousness with which the EU competes with the nation-state for people’s 
affection, identity and political loyalty is counterproductive. It appears to send con-
fusing messages which suggest that the nation-state and the EU are equal projects 
with the same political objectives, though pursued on different levels, which will 
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lead to the desired form of European identity. That, eventually, people will add to 
their ethnicity and their national identity another, European layer, and that this over 
and above level will lead to the same political loyalty to the EU as it did with the 
nation-state. 
The EU’s objectives may serve the nation-state, but in terms of identity, they 
are not the same. The EU, unlike the nation-state, does not have a preferred nation, 
it is non-national at heart and trans-national in scope; the identity it seeks is politi-
cal without the appeals to ethnic or national particularity, the emotiveness of which 
it seeks to curb. Given the war-torn history of the European peoples in the past, it 
is not a bad thing, but not a sufficient basis for the formation of a convincing Eu-
ropean identity. One way, and possibly the only way out of the current ‘battle’ for 
identity is to acknowledge the real impact of the EU on the nation-state and open a 
debate by both European and national elites about which challenges of our time can 
be met by the EU and which are better kept at the national level. Citizens of Europe 
may then understand better how their national aspirations, individual concerns and 
political demands are mediated between different levels of governance within the 
EU (Olson, 1993) and adapt their identities accordingly – loyalty and passion for 
the EU may follow too. 
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Erika Harris
NACIONALNA DRŽAVA I EUROPSKA UNIJA: 
IZGUBLJENI U BORBI ZA IDENTITET
Sažetak
Ovaj članak, koji se temelji na proučavanjima nacionalizma, razmatra for-
miranje identiteta u Europskoj uniji uspoređujući je s nacionalnom državom. 
Njegovo je polazište da EU, unatoč svim svojim ekonomskim prednostima 
i političkoj inovaciji, ne uspijeva ljudima pružiti osjećaj pripadnosti ni steći 
političku lojalnost. Na osnovi ispitivanja koju funkciju identitet obavlja – za 
nacionalnu državu u prošlosti i za EU u sadašnjosti – ustvrđuje se kako je 
sposobnost EU-a da projicira značajan europski identitet ograničena, ali da 
postoje i granice sposobnosti nacionalne države da udovolji političkim iza-
zovima suvremenih društava. Jedan od izlaza, možda i jedini, iz te “borbe za 
identitet” jest priznavanje zbiljskoga utjecaja EU-a na nacionalnu državu te 
otvaranje iskrene rasprave i europskih i nacionalnih elita o tome s kojim se 
izazovima našega vremena može uhvatiti u koštac EU, a koje je bolje zadržati 
na nacionalnoj razini. Bolje razumijevanje toga kako se nacionalne aspiraci-
je, preokupacije i politički zahtjevi ljudi posreduju među različitim razinama 
upravljanja moglo bi dovesti do odgovarajuće prilagodbe njihovih identiteta 
– a za time bi mogli uslijediti i lojalnost i privrženost EU-u.
Ključne riječi: nacionalna država, nacionalizam, nacionalni identitet, Europ-
ska unija, europski identitet
Kontakt: Erika Harris, Department of Politics, Roxby Building, University of Li-
verpool, Liverpool L69 7ZT, UK. E-mail: E.Harris@liverpool.ac.uk
Politička misao, god. 48, br. 2, 2011, str. 91-109
